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Command and Moral ForcesPublished on 05/02/2021

General Military Review No. 56
le général Xavier PINEAU

"When we look at the four components that make up the atmosphere of war, we see that: danger, physical effort, uncertainty and chance, it is easy to understand that it takes great moral and physical strength to move forward with any guarantee of success in this disconcerting element.1 »

Wemight consider that, by dint of having been exploited, the vein of moral strength has been exhausted and that since Ardant du Picq and Clausewitz - whose reading is always recommended - much has been written on the subject. Yet, even if the deep nature of man remains, even if the main characteristics of war remain the same, it makes sense to put the work back on the job regularly, if only to ensure that current societal expectations or the contingencies of the wars of the moment do not alter the perception we have of the subject.

Fire: Enemy of the relief force soldierPublished on 17/11/2020

General Tactical Review - Fire
Chef de bataillon Cyrille CHAUVEAU, CBA Yannick LE GAL, CBA Perrine MONTEL,CBA Jean-Benoît TINARD

Fire remains at the heart of current events and always causes astonishment in the face of its outburst. The millions of hectares burned in Australia in 2020 or the fire at Notre Dame de Paris in 2019 are the latest examples of catastrophic fires. Confronted with this timeless enemy, the fire soldier is constantly evolving his procedures through innovation and hardening. The fight against fire is indeed a real battle, with its codes, means and tactics.

La Pointe de l'ÉguillettePublished on 16/11/2020

General Tactical Review - Fire
Colonel François-Régis LEGRIER, COM TN/ Chef de la division adaptation préparation à l’engagement

In the summer of 1793, back in France after an unfortunate expedition to Sardinia1, Bonaparte found himself near Carteaux, which was besieging Toulon then occupied bythe English. The two men already knew each other because Bonaparte had helped Carteaux take Avignon from the counter-revolutionaries some time before. Carteaux did not particularly appreciate the man he ironically called the "captain canon" but nevertheless invited him to witness the fire of the English fleet which was to be carried out by the artillery under the command of Dammartin. Let Marmont tell the rest: "Bonaparte, as a man of the trade, knew what to expect on arrival and announced that the cannonballs would not go into the sea (...) four cannon shots were enough to make it clear how much the fire had been caused by the cannon.The preparations made were ridiculous; Ollioules was given a low ear and it was believed with good reason that it was best to hold Captain Bonaparte and report to him.2 »

Regimental artilleryPublished on 13/11/2020

General Tactical Review - Fire
Colonel Christophe de LAJUDIE, État-major des armées, délégation interarmées aux réserves

In an attempt to understand the reasons for the erratic evolution of regimental joint structures, the case of equipping infantry battalions with light pieces is exemplary.

"To get victory, you must want the battle."Published on 10/11/2020

General Tactical Review - Fire 2/2
Général de corps d’armée Pierre GILLET, commandant le Corps de réaction rapide-France

To defeat an enemy, you must accept confrontation on all terrains. Immaterial actions weaken minds (psychic warfare), neutralize command systems (war in the electromagnetic spectrum) or blind them. But in any case, the opposing soldier must put down his weapons. He will therefore have to be physically restrained; this remains the priority of military action.

Reflections on the reappropriation of combat in the face of a major enemy Published on 06/11/2020

General Tactical Review - Fire 1/2
Général de corps d’armée Pierre GILLET, commandant le Corps de réaction rapide-France

The theme of reappropriating war in the face of a major enemy is very present in military thinking. Armies have a great deal of recent experience in peacekeeping, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations, but they no longer have practical experience "of" war.a sustained confrontation between masses of aggressive manoeuvres contesting each other to the depths and in different environments all the fields of conflict (physical and immaterial) and whose objective is to defeat the power of the adversary" 1.

The rise to high intensity, a comparative analysis of rugby and land forcesPublished on 05/11/2020

General Tactical Review - Fire
Général de corps d’armée Vincent GUIONIE, commandant des forces terrestres

The parallels between rugby and combat engagement have been the subject of numerous writings1 ,emphasising the tactical parallels, the moral forces, necessary in both rugby and combat, and the common principles. All these points are perfectly relevant. Rugby is obviously a sport very close to "tactics" as understood in the army: conquering and mastering the field, specialisation of dedicated "operational functions", articulation, staggering, etc. The principles of warfare defined in France find full expression there.

General Tactical Review - FirePublished on 04/11/2020

Colonel Stéphane FAUDAIS, rédacteur en chef, titulaire de la Chaire de tactique générale

General Jean Delmas1 very early on hypothesized that the tactical doctrines had been developed chronologically in three successive stages: they first theorized the association of shock and movement, then the introduction of fire, in general, in the maneuver. Third stage: the consideration of nuclear fire. Nothing has really changed since then, even if some believe that immaterial fields have revolutionized tactics, creating a fourth stage.

In the face of high intensity, what tactical commander tomorrow?Published on 25/10/2020

Synthesis of the Army Doctrine and Command Education Centre (CDEC) symposium
Chloé Malet, rédacteur du pôle études et prospective du CDEC

On 6 February 2020, the École militaire hosted the annual Military Thought Symposium on the theme "Faced with High Intensity, What Tactical Leader for Tomorrow? ». As with previous editions, this symposium is part of the movement to renew military thought within the Army, as advocated by the CLS, instigated by the Centre de doctrine et d'enseignement du commandement (CDEC) and its director, Major General Michel Delion.

Did the revolutionary armies of 1792 and Napoleon's Grande Armée derive their strength from their technology?Published on 24/10/2020

Brennus 2.0
Lieutenant-colonel Georges Housset, du pôle études et prospective du CDEC

Dince the end of the Seven Years' War (1763) until the end of the Seven Years' War (1763).to thethe outbreak of the Revolution, we are witnessing, particularly in France, an extraordinary bubbling of energy. dideas, favored by twenty-nine years of peace, if theexcept for theAmerican episode. At during this period known as "theof the Enlightenment, while military personnel reflect... on theart of warfare, mathematicians, astronomers, physicists......find out, invent and build new science.

The revolutionaries of 1789 were not long in coming.acThe aim is to capture this profusion of "skills" which includes a wide range of skills.countless inventors, thinkers and creators. These are put at the service ofa political power, looking foraméliorations ofa military tool that should make it possible toensure thethe foundation of the young Republic before thewhich stands theAll of Europe[1]. That "this"... call to scholars "is formalised at the first meeting.nion of the Committee of Public Salvation on April 9, 1793.

In fact, during the said meeting, a "Committee of Public Salvation" was created. commission of "chemists and mechanics"intended to seek and experience new means intended for the defence of the Nation: cis the first scientific and technical commissioncrux of the matter[2].