Beyond the physical oppression that can be experienced in the urban environment (stairwells, tunnels, underground passages), and the close proximity of mortal danger, Battalion Commander Frédéric Chamaud shows that the urban theater can be considered as a stress catalyst space, exposing all combat and support units to multiple sources of psychological injuries. More than anywhere else, it is therefore crucial to know how to identify risks, to prevent them and to ensure the support of specialised units as soon as possible.

It is customary for the chief to think according to the maxim "The field commands". Captain (TA) Grégory Ollier considers that, if the development of the land is of military interest acquired in all areas of action, extending it by transforming the town planning of the city from the tactical level is the way to take the initiative.

Will it be reasonable to fight in urban areas in 2035?

In truth, that is not the question. We simply will have no choice. Colonel Pierre Santoni is clearing a few avenues for 2035, aimed at improving our tactical engagement capabilities in urban areas.e with a view to regaining real freedom of manoeuvre, from which will come the tactical victory which, if well exploited in the media, will be transformed into a strategic victory.

Contemporary conflictuality makes us rediscover that war in cities, places of concentration of power and population, is the real issue in today's conflicts. Lieutenant-Colonel Laurent Luisetti shows that it would be risky to think that it is possible to engage in urbanised areas without special operational preparation and a solid doctrinal basis. The urban area must be approached as a singular environment in its own right, in which the combatant must possess the appropriate know-how.

Thechoice of outsourcing is still fundamentally guided by a logic of at least cost control, if not cost reduction: why would it be appropriate to outsource a more economical function when it is kept in-house? In this context, this article sets out a simple principle, but it is of course not exhaustive and is not intended to be dogmatic: in order to control costs, outsourcing should not be carried out in a monopoly or monopsonist situation.

This article appears in the Cahiers with the kind permission of Penser les Ailes françaises, the magazine in which it appeared a few months ago. Sustainable development is indeed a concern of the entire Ministry of Defence, and however constraining it may be, it is now an inescapable notion, engraved in the law. Even if the example of BA 123 certainly represents an extreme case because it is emblematic, many regiments or land-based defence bases will have to learn from Colonel Luc de Rancourt's experience. As such, his testimony has its place in the Cahiers; it highlights the difficulty for the military leader to reconcile two a priori contradictory objectives: the local implementation of the sustainable development policy and the durability of the combat tool.

This article by Colonel Michel Goya has been published under the title "La guerre de trois mois: l'intervention militaire française au Mali en perspectives" [1] in the journal of the French Institute of International Relations [2], Politique étrangère, volume 78, n°2, summer 2013.

1 ] The photos were not part of the article.

2] The Editorial Committee of the CESAT Papers would like to thank the Institute and the author for authorizing the publication of this article.

Squadron leader Thierry Pern pleaded for the end of the "Ministry of Defence" appellation and a return to the original appellation of the Fifth Republic: the Ministry of the Armed Forces^. An illustration of this personal opinion is proposed at the end of the speech through the example of the nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical (NRBC) issues.

Having come to power in 1970 after overthrowing his own father, the current sovereign of Oman has profoundly reformed his country during a reign that was a priori exemplary. From a backward and poor country, divided by two major rebellions and situated in a region that was nevertheless conducive to crises and tensions, he has made a haven of peace, tolerance and prosperity.

In order to achieve this, Sultan Qaboos bin Said was able to give great political modernity to his autocratic system, while respecting the traditional principles of government. The purpose of this short article is to present how and with what constraints an Arab ruler, perfectly accustomed to Western political culture, must know how to rule as a true tribal chief in order to maintain his legitimacy and effectiveness.

Methods of improving the performance of armies can be inspired by those of civilian activities in the functional area, but not in the operational area.