At a time when France is about to acquire armed drones, it seems interesting to try to draw up an assessment of American strikes in Afghanistan in order to be in a position to question the limits of the use of these means. This article will show that drones are by no means a panacea and that their effectiveness depends on the existence of a system, both human and technical, capable of providing precise and up-to-date information on where and when to strike.

The article focuses on the participation of an Austrian military unit in the EUFOR TCHAD/RCA mission, which ran from January 2008 to March 2009. This contribution of the Austrian armies immerses us in other realities. Far from the fury of the fighting in Afghanistan and the gigantic size of the NATO machine, it is the contribution of these third powers to peace operations that we are talking about. A modest but very real contribution, and one that cannot be dispensed with in the name of the necessary international legitimacy that the coalitions are seeking.

On April 25, the New York Times published an article analyzing documents classified as "secret" by the DoD [1]. These documents, known as DAB[2], are reports on the various detainees held in Guantanamo Bay prison between 2002 and early 2009. The Pentagon immediately condemned the revelation of this information, highlighting in particular the imperatives of national security. The source of these leaks is once again the "wikileaks" website, which had already stunned the world at the end of July 2010 by releasing 75,000 pages of classified documents relating to the activities of American forces in Afghanistan.

[1] Department of Defense

[2] Detainee's Assessment briefs

From the individual adventures of French officers in the service of the Sikh kingdom of Punjab between 1822 and 1849, generic lessons can be drawn, which are still valid today for the soldiers serving in Afghanistan.

"Neither swords, nor great elephants, nor cavalry, nor infantry help as much as intelligence to succeed in one's designs."

Pañchatantra, 5th ^century

At a time when the armed forces are refocusing on the conduct of operations, the core of their profession, one may question the relevance of maintaining a military chaplaincy. It is in operations that it finds its justification. Through the original status it confers on its members, it now has the capacity to give meaning to the actions of soldiers on operations.

The often abusive use of English and a visible deference to American military culture, which is fairly regularly shown by the French military, is a major obstacle to the development of the French language.However, these are symptomatic of a certain envious fascination with that country's military superpower and the internalization of their military, doctrinal and strategic subordination.

Although, by definition, an initiative is considered to be a variant of the plan prescribed by the higher echelon, it is not an act of disobedience provided it is within the interpretation of the chief's intent. This initiative can only result, on the one hand, from the expression of a community of thought necessary for the appropriation of this intention and, on the other hand, from the consideration of sufficient room for manoeuvre left to the subordinate by his leader.

An example for generations of officers, General Leclerc can also claim to serve as a reference for managerial action. By applying a grid of managerial reading to the action of this emblematic figure, the author invites us to reconsider the existing or supposed, even honored, relationships between the fields of command and management.

A methodology aimed at exercising critical thinking and creativity, Design is the art of structuring a complex operational environment in order to identify and solve the key problem it represents. Inspired by the systemic method and enriched by the teachings of Iraq and Afghanistan, Design proposes to first discern the nature of the problem before solving it. Far from fashionable effects, it is an intellectually worked concept that should be observed and studied, because it is an approach adapted to a changing operational environment.

Challenged by the generalisation of diffuse and uncontrolled violence, the state's use of armed force, even if only as a deterrent, risks gradually eroding the very concept of power. Military intervention can only strengthen the legitimacy of an international community with a force that is universally recognized as virtuous and consistent with a redefining geopolitical paradigm.