The success of the 1968 airlift in support of the beleaguered Marines at the Khé Sanh base in Vietnam was due first of all to the Niagara bombing operation, which allowed the Americans to maintain the initiative. But above all, the siege was such that this success would probably not have occurred without three new refuelling techniques described here.

The author concludes by putting into perspective the air operations conducted at Khé Sanh and Diên-Biên-Phu in 1954, and paves the way to a reflection on the fundamental aspect of the capacity for innovation and on the future means that could be dedicated to air-landing.

"In the present future, in which any strategic conception necessarily moves, we must both draw on past experience and invent the adaptation of this experience to new means. Any innovation is a major risk, but any routine is lost in advance".

General Beaufre[1]

1] "Introduction to the Strategy", Chapter II.

The Allied airlift over Berlin between 1948 and 1949 underlined the importance of air transport in conflict resolution. The military effect to be achieved, even if it is not offensive in this case, is part of a dual logic of force projection and power projection. It is in fact consistent with the political objective defined in advance, designed to draw back the adversary or restore a deteriorated military situation.

Less well known than Operation Vittles [1], Operation Nickel Grass, carried out in 1973 by the US Military Airlift Command (MAC), is the first of its kind in the world.operation, carried out in 1973 by the US MAC (Military Airlift Command) in support of the operations carried out by the Israelis to counter the Syrian-Egyptian offensive of October 1973, is part of the same logic.

At a time when, in the field of military airlift, France and a number of our European partners are preparing for the arrival of the A400M, and when a new generation of military airlift is being developed, it is essential that we take the necessary steps to ensure that it can be used in the most efficient way possible.is under way to set up a multinational command structure, the EATC[2], the lessons learned from Operation Nickel Grass are far from negligible.

Indeed, one can legitimately question the use of the transport capacity offered by this new aircraft, the advisability of equipping it with an in-flight refuelling boom and the sharing of operational control within a supranational entity.

A reminder of the facts will make it possible to understand the involvement and the role played by American military air transport in the Yom Kippur War and will open up some lines of thought on the arrival of the A400M in the forces.

1] Name given to the air bridge over Berlin between 1948 and 1949.

2] EATC: European air transport command,

Paris, an entrenched camp, was defended in 1914 as provided for in the 1909 siege war instruction. The application of this text to Paris is a little peculiar since the city is surrounded by a triple belt of fortifications: the continuous enclosure of approximately 32 kilometres of tower comprising 94 bastions and then, at a variable distance, a first belt of forts, known as detached, built at the same time as the enclosure, from 1840 to 1845. Finally, the belt of forts Séré de Rivières was built from 1874 to 1880. Let us mention a few names to specify the locations: Issy, Vanves and East forts for example for the former, Vaujours, Saint-Cyr and Villeneuve-Saint-Georges forts for the latter.

On 9 April 2003 in "liberated" Baghdad, Corporal X of the 4th Marine Regiment ^affixed a starry banner to the statue of Saddam Hussein. An officer rushed up and ordered him to remove the flag. But it was too late. The picture of this symbolic image will go around the world. It will fuel the idea that the United States is engaged in an annexation war in Iraq.

The notion of "strategic corporal" developed in the late 1990s by American General Charles Krulak is particularly well embodied in this case. In fact, through a media magnifying glass phenomenon, an individual action of tactical scope can be transformed into a real strategic "buzz" [1].

Whether we welcome it, in the name of the transparency of military action, or whether we deplore it, in the name of a fair assessment of the action of the forces, it is now a reality. Its impact on command in operations should not be neglected. It could even constitute a revolution in the art of leading men to fire.

1] Originally a marketing technique, buzz can also describe a phenomenon of media amplification that, from a local event, makes it a subject of national or international concern.

Counterinsurgency is in fashion. Iraq and Afghanistan have revived the study of strategies and tactics developed during the wars of decolonization. However, in this regard, some lessons could already be drawn from a somewhat older history. The insurrectional uprisings that took place in Western France during the revolutionary period are a good example, even if they took place in the specific context of a civil war.

On April 16, 2009, just a few days after the launch of a North Korean Unha-2 rocket supposedly carrying a communications satellite, the main page of the website of the South Korean progressive-oriented daily "Hankyoreh" showed a photo entitled "The North Korean rocket Unha-2": "Preparations for South Korea's first space rocket at the Naro Space Center in South Jeolla Province on April 15. South Korea is planning an orbital flight in July 2009". This soberly commented picture comes in a special context. The United Nations Security Council has just condemned North Korea's April 5 rocket launch as a ballistic missile test, and North Korea has reiterated that the launch is not a ballistic missile test.North Korea announced on 15 April that it was withdrawing from nuclear disarmament talks and that it would rehabilitate its nuclear research facilities that were being dismantled. The publicity in Seoul about the South Korean rocket and the launch that finally took place on 25 August 2009 is therefore not entirely harmless. In any case, it raises the question of the meaning of this programme for South Korea and its neighbours.

Ambitious, the South Korean space launcher programme dates back only a few years but has now been given concrete form by the half-success of a first launch, which makes it necessary to evaluate its significance in its regional geopolitical context, especially in the context of the confrontation with Pyongyang.

As Marc BLOCH reminds us at the end of the disastrous French campaign of 1940, "our leaders did not know how to think about this war" [1]. 1] By this scathing observation, he attributed the responsibility for the military defeat, among others, to the French command at the time. 70 years after his uncompromising analysis of our failures, we may wonder whether all the lessons of this brutal military collapse have really been learned. Looking back, events show that mentalities, methods and, above all, the training of future leaders have undergone a salutary evolution.

1] Marc BLOCH, "TheStrange Defeat".

On 15 June 2009, the Council of the European Union decided to extend Operation Atalanta for one year, starting on 13 December 2009. This military operation, which is taking place in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy, is based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions (1814, 1816, 1838 and 1851). It aims to combat the increasing acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Despite the major media coverage of the attacks, it must be acknowledged that the economic and financial impact on the maritime transport sector, which is currently experiencing a crisis of overcapacity, is generally limited.

First, the situation in the Gulf of Aden and the low-intensity threat posed by the phenomenon of piracy should be presented, and then the consequences for a sector in crisis should be observed.

On 17 September 2009, Barack Obama officially announced the abandonment of the project to deploy long-range anti-missile missiles [1] on Polish territory [2] and a radar to be associated with them in the Czech Republic.

This decision reflects the pragmatic vision of the American President and his willingness to pursue a more flexible foreign policy than before.However, it seems premature in many respects to speak of a real "American strategic turnaround" [3].

3] This partly explains why Poland continues to rely on the United States as a guarantor of its security.

1] Or GBI (Ground Based Interceptors).

2] Agreement reached on 20 August 2008, in the midst of the Georgian crisis.

3] Expression taken from Le Monde of 19 September 2009. The title of the article announces that "The United States renounces the anti-missile shield" (sic).

Since the disappearance of the linear devices of the Alliance's niches, a notion has been stirring up a lot of minds in terms of tactical thinking, that of the so-called gap spaces. The example of the Battle of the Marne is edifying in this respect.