The excellent organisation of the 2008 Olympic Games gives the People's Republic of China (PRC) an image of unquestionable modernity. China, which was crowned first place in the Olympics, has shown itself to be united around a common project.

Determined to gain the status of a great power[1], China has become a global economic player in the space of 30 years. On the international scene, its return illustrates Beijing's determination not to let other powers write history in its place. However, this immense country is facing social difficulties that could hinder its development.

This article proposes to assess the strengths and weaknesses of a major emerging power.

1] The sinologist Joseph Needham pointed out in the 20th century that 17th-century China enjoyed a considerable technical lead over the Western powers. He pointed out that China had brought twenty-four innovations to the West, including powder, wheelbarrows, printing, cast iron and the magnetic compass. This technological advance made it a great world power.

Who would know David Galula if General Petraeus hadn't made him the vade me cum of all the American officers going to Iraq and Afghanistan? His main work, Counterinsurgency, Theory and Practice, was first published in 1963, but its first publication in France by ^Economica was only 45 years later and it is a translation from English! General Petraeus writes in his preface to the French edition: "It is an honor for us to participate in this way in therecognition by the French military community of one of its own.

The Supreme Commander of NATO's military forces is still an American Army General: the first was General Eisenhower, and the second - excuse me - was Marshal Montgomery. This general wears "two hats", that of SACEUR (supreme commander of NATO forces) and that of USAREUR (commander of US forces stationed in Europe and Turkey).

France became a strategic island when the threats disappeared at its borders. At the same time, it has never been so economically open to a world that tends to replace the bipolar confrontation with a new "grand game" between many rivals. Placed in a similar situation at the beginning of the 19th century^{, the} United Kingdom managed to reign over a quarter of the world's population in just a few decades. At a time when France is questioning its national strategy, it is perhaps worth examining the reasons for the British success at the heart of the first globalisation.

The crisis that we are experiencing is shocking because of the level of illusion (believing or making people believe in the endless increase in US property prices), naivety (believing in the self-regulation of financial institutions) and the lack of transparency.naivety (believing in the self-regulation of financiers with an extreme appetite for profits), incompetence combined with a high degree of sophistication of the instruments, all of which ultimately leads to a total loss of sight of the notion of risk.

The story seems implausible. In fact, the excesses of finance are the consequence of deep economic imbalances in a globalised economy between countries with different economies.developed countries (mainly the United States) and emerging countries (China in particular) sheltered from the large liquidity resulting from these imbalances. We will try to unravel this web by analysing the causes, the different phases and the conditions for emerging from the crisis.

It is difficult to find a victorious outcome to a war in the midst of populations without the troops of the sovereign state taking the fight into account. It is still necessary to know what form this fighting force should take between respect for the local military culture, at the risk of contradiction with allied forces and objectives, and mimicry, at the risk of maladjustment to the environment and therefore inefficiency.

The case of Iraq is a good example of the difficulties of this arbitration.

From the end of the Great War, the real staging, by the American journalist Thomas Lowell and the British military writer Liddell Hart in particular, of T.E.'s dazzling personality. Lawrence and his action at the side of Emir Faisal during the Arab revolt tended to make the role and place of the French contingents deployed in the Hijaz from the second half of 1916 sink into oblivion. In 1919-1921, in the Levant, the difficult establishment of the French mandate on Syria and the diplomatic choices of Paris, which very early on recognised the Turkish nationalist government in Ankara, led to the not very glorious withdrawal from Cilicia.

While still relatively unknown because it is often overshadowed by the neighbouring landing on 6 June 1944, the campaign in Brittany from 1944 to 1945 is interesting for more than one reason. If only by its duration: started with the SAS [1] drops the day before June 6, it ends after the surrender of May 8, 1945. One could cite the problem of "pockets" as a field of interest for military history enthusiasts. (St-NAZAIRE and LORIENT), the very high level of inter-service and joint cooperation among the Americans (and a little forced among the Germans...), the "pockets" problem (St-NAZAIRE and LORIENT) and the "pockets" problem (St-NAZAIRE and LORIENT).), the important role of the French resistance (maquis of St Marcel and Saffré, FFI battalions, intelligence and escape networks), the deception operations launched by the Americans, the particularly dense Atlantic Wall in this region, etc... This article will focus on the logistical aspects of the campaign.

1] Special Air Service. In fact the 2nd French Airborne Regiment.

"Anarmy that fights the weak becomes weak."

Martin Van Creveld.

The report of the Winograd Commission[1] on the war between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 is particularly enlightening on the vulnerabilitiess psychological vulnerabilities that can affect an army that has lost the habit of fighting an adversary to its measure, within a nation that itself believes itself to be protected from any major threat.

1] Published in an interim version in April 2007 and in its final version on January 30, 2008.

The Rif War is now a forgotten war. At a time when the interest of military history is being reaffirmed in officer training and when the lessons of the war ofAt a time when the interest of military history is reaffirmed in the training of officers and when the lessons of the Indochina War and even more of the Algerian War for counter-insurgency are rediscovered, does the Rif War have nothing to teach us or relearn?

A quick rereading of this war shows, however, that its RETEX is of disturbing topicality, at a time when, for example, our commitment is becoming more marked in Afghanistan. The purpose of this article is to encourage a re-examination of the Rif war, which deserves much more than an oblivion, through three tactical examples related to the terrain, the constitution of forces and finally to the population.