After three decades of limited and low-intensity engagements, the French Army is today part of a profound strategic landscapecharacterized by polymorphous and extra-territorial threats, competitive relations in all fields of confrontation and a worrying change in the international order.

A questioning on the principles of warfare adopted by the French army cannot avoid a study on those that the other great military powers set themselves.

In the field of the art and science of warfare, European theorists have been interested since antiquity in the search for fundamental rules enabling the strategist and tactician to gain the upper hand over an adversary. Inspired by each other over the centuries, they have contributed to the emergence of a common corpus, which each nation today declines according to its own military culture. The principles of war can just as easily be understood as precepts of strategy and precepts of manoeuvre.

The Command Doctrine and Training Centre (CDEC) plays a key role in developing and disseminating thinking on the current and future use of land forces in France.

In the light of the first deliveries of GRIFFON emblematic material of the SCORPION program planned for this summer, the question of what the SCORPION fight changes is fundamental.
In this context, the doctrinal aspect through the work of LCS2 sheds light on this trace, the aim of which is, more than these deliveries, to provide our land forces with a high-performance combat tool whose main characteristics must be understood by everyone today. While the set of The French Army has naturally taken possession of the SCORPION "totem" and is seeking in its field of expertise to apply its specific features. Today, it is important to have a common and shared vision of the key notions of this system of systems.

Technology alone cannot win the war, but it can help us to win. Technology, which is the most important element in the battles fought by Western armies, is constantly evolving and we have always tried to surpass our opponents in this field. Without being techno-dependent, we have historically relied on material means to facilitate our engagements. However, the permanent appreciation of the leader is always the essence of our tactical success. It is therefore a question of being able to make the best use of possible of the technique but knowing how to do without it.

Do we sufficiently remember the impact that the simple introduction of radio on the battlefield equipment could have had on the leaders who wanted to seize it? By comparison, is there a clear awareness of the potential for change that the creation of info-enhanced units tomorrow could represent?

In reality, the tools promised by the SCORPION programme should make it possible to go far beyond simple capability gains.

Black Hawk Down is one of the most iconic war movies. Produced and directed by Ridley Scott in 2001, it is the adaptation of the book, Black Hawk Down: a story of Modern Warfarewritten by Mark Bowden.

Surprise has always been a phenomenon integral to war. Throughout history, the importance of surprise has been apparent in numerous studies on strategic thinking. Surprise can occur in diverse domains, including geographic space, time, technology and doctrine. Not mutually exclusive, these fields in which surprise has been achieved can be combined in order to increase its effects.

Interculturality is hardly a new subject. However, a clear concep-tualization of the term is yet to emerge and be applied on a conscious and voluntary basis. The successive stages in military history - war amidst populations, indigenization of troops and the identification of the popula-tion as the center of gravity - reveal the need for this intercultural factor to be taken into account in the areas of both tactics and military strategy.