Counter-insurgency conflicts leave two main modes of operation emerge for the regular forces: the "vcoming and going» from bases or permanent presence at within the population. The first mode is the most used, because it seems the least risky and the most suitable to get quick results. History tends yet to show that the second, under certain conditions, is not only more effective against the enemy, but also less costly in terms of lives... human. In this regard, the experience of Combined Action Platoons during the Vietnam War is interesting, because she's one of the only ones who's done subject to scientific analysis.

If interculturality is not a subject new, although the word does not exist not yet in the dictionary, she is just taking a long time to be clearly defined, conceptualized and implemented in a manner conscious and willing.

War among the people, the indigenization of the troops, the identification of the population as the centre of gravity are as many successive marks, marking out the course of military history, which shows the need but also the level "of intelligence» of this taking into account of the intercultural factor in military tactics or strategy. Like Mr Jourdain, Field Marshals Gallieni or Lyautey were doing interculturality. without knowing it or naming it, at least in those terms.

The integration of small volumes of officers from the countries at war (of the order of five per theatre) in the French units deployed in areas of operations, with for those who have completed a full course of study¹² in our training schools and have followed the conditioning final before screening, the possibility to live fully in combat companies and to participate in their command in operations.

As much as the creation and development of the goums belong more to the Moroccan adventure, as much as those of the spahis find its roots in the conquest of Algeria. Even if Lyautey, an aesthete of his image, likes to appear in blue and white burnous, he likes to be only counts in the history of the spahis because he's the first one to propose native riders to participate in the fights... of August-September 1914.

Proud of his experiences in Algeria, Indochina and Madagasfor, Lyautey, when he was appointed to pacify Morocco from of Algeria and Casablanca, will develop during fifteen years a state of mind among military executives, and civilians, value indigenous troops⁵ and restructure the army of Africa. First ofall, it strives to protect the local authorities and populations by calling for "empathy and generosity " among the local managers and the local population . military and civilians.

L’use of local troops by Marshal Lyautey was an element of its strategy to penetrate, pacify and rally the population.and unity of Morocco. By relying on regular and special forces, theforces from all the tribes of Morocco, it has also been able to use tactical means of seasoned local fighters, who were acting in discovery and in intelligence of more heavily harnessed units, which by the 1930s had already finished by keeping the territories pacified. This article describes Lyautey's vision of what the the role of the African army in the colonial work, training and employment of troops through the local spahis and goumiers, and finally it proposes lessons to be learned of this experience within the framework of the current operational military partnership and the strategy of influence that accompanies it.

The fourth factor of complexity in decision making operational is an Arlesian called global approach²⁹(comprehensive approach). Arlesian because although it evokes­for many years, this global approach has been is still struggling to materialize in reality. There is no question of here to limit itself to the civil aspects­mwell known ilitic diseases, but to deal more broadly with the compartmentalization of the totality of global players who contribute to the management of a crisis³⁰.

Modern command systems are therefore hampered in operations, by a very high degree of complexity that is not only related to that of the environment, but also well often to the systems and command organization themselves-themselves. This complexity, which varies according to the context, always of the various commitments, can be characterized either as follows by porosity, or by a partitioning between levels deci­levels, between media, between contributors to the resolution of the between kinetic effects and informational actions, and between functional chains within the same staff.

"War has taught me that to succeed, I must have a purpose, a plan, a method. To have a goal, you have to know what you want to achieve. wants, to make a plan, you have to know what you can do. To have a the general rule, elementary in daily life, for the following purposes come up with any kind of a result. Pick one for yourself. Do it-you a plan. Set your agenda. And with that, have ideas, concentrate your efforts, don't scatter your time and energy. Careful. »¹² - Ferdinand Foch

"Recenttechnology might appear to have closed the gap between leaders and subordinates .Armed with unprecedented amounts of data, CEOs, politicians, and bureaucrats can peer into what is happening almost as it occurs. As we discussed, this information can seduce leaders into thinking that they understand and can predict complex situations - that they can see what will happen.But the speed and interdependence of our current environment means that what we cannot know has grown even faster than what we can. »¹Stanley McChrystal